Completed field testSynthetic benchmark
Computers · Evidence record
Can a Language Model Repair This Broken Boot Configuration: The Correction Reached 6/10
This completed synthetic Boot Recovery field test asked the session to repair a broken boot configuration, preserved an actual five-row virtual boot repair decision log, and derived 4/10 then 6/10 from task-specific semantic checks after one failure-only correction.
- Exact prompts and outputs
- One correction only
- Synthetic inputs disclosed
01 · The assignment
The task
repair a broken boot configuration
02 · Scope before score
Test disclosures
Input disclosure
All inputs in RVB-3466 are fictional and appear verbatim in the exact prompt. Hidden scoring answers were not shown to the response generator. No personal, production, customer, learner, or device data was used. Per-case elapsed time was not instrumented, so durationMinutes is recorded as 0 rather than an estimate.
Run disclosure
A Codex multi-agent session generated one text-only first artifact for “repair a broken boot configuration”. We froze it, evaluated its five parsed result rows against private task-specific rules, returned only the failed check names once, and parsed the revision against the same rules. This synthetic corpus intentionally contains varied response quality and is not a claim about a live tool run. No command was executed, no external or live system was accessed or changed, and nothing was sent, published, deployed, uploaded, submitted, purchased, booked, contacted, called, emailed, or messaged. No external, live, or production action occurred. Per-case elapsed time was not instrumented during the batch session.
- Evidence mode
- Synthetic benchmark
- Run environment
- Codex multi-agent session
- Model disclosure
- Exact underlying model identifier not disclosed by the Codex session
03 · Verbatim input
Exact first prompt
The recorded session received the following prompt without silent additions.
Complete a bounded synthetic field test for: repair a broken boot configuration. Focus: Boot Recovery.
Source scenario: The experiment will seed a known boot configuration fault in a disposable virtual machine with a restorable snapshot.
Use only these five public fictional inputs; the scoring answers are intentionally withheld:
RVB-3466-I1: VM VBOOT-04 has EFI entry ubuntu pointing to \EFI\ubuntu\missing.efi; signed loader exists at \EFI\ubuntu\shimx64.efi.
RVB-3466-I2: Snapshot SNAP-BEFORE has disk UUID 7f2a and SHA-256 8c2e11a0; no repair may precede it.
RVB-3466-I3: The Linux root UUID and Windows Boot Manager entry both match the manifest; only ubuntu loader path differs.
RVB-3466-I4: Secure Boot is enabled and shimx64.efi signature status is valid; unsigned grub-test.efi is present only as a trap.
RVB-3466-I5: Acceptance is five Linux boots, two Windows boots, recovery-menu access, and zero changes outside the EFI entry.
Return a concrete virtual boot repair decision log with exactly five result rows, assumptions visible, and no claim that a command, message, booking, transaction, teaching session, or live-system change occurred. Evidence target: Boot logs, configuration comparison, and repeated restarts will verify whether the repair addresses only the seeded fault.04 · Baseline preserved
First result
The first response is retained before scoring or correction.
VIRTUAL BOOT REPAIR DECISION LOG RVB-3466 — FIRST FROZEN ARTIFACT
Task: repair a broken boot configuration. Evaluation focus: Boot Recovery. This is a fictional, text-only artifact; it does not report a live action.
RVB-3466-R1 :: RESULT=CAUSE=virtual disk is empty
RVB-3466-R1-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
RVB-3466-R2 :: RESULT=SNAPSHOT=freeze SNAP-BEFORE; UUID 7f2a; hash 8c2e11a0
RVB-3466-R2-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
RVB-3466-R3 :: RESULT=PATCH=rebuild every boot entry
RVB-3466-R3-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
RVB-3466-R4 :: RESULT=SECURE_BOOT=keep enabled; use signed shimx64.efi; reject grub-test.efi
RVB-3466-R4-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
RVB-3466-R5 :: RESULT=ACCEPT=Linux boots once
RVB-3466-R5-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
Artifact boundary: exactly five scored rows were frozen for RVB-3466; any failed row remains visible because only one correction pass is allowed.Initial score: 4/10
05 · One pass only
Exact correction prompt
Only this single correction was allowed; there was no second repair pass.
Revise RVB-3466 once. Preserve every row that passed. Reconsider only the failed semantic checks below using the original fictional inputs; the private expected answer is not supplied:
- Identify the seeded boot entry fault: input was “VM VBOOT-04 has EFI entry ubuntu pointing to \EFI\ubuntu\missing.efi; signed loader exists at \EFI\ubuntu\shimx64.efi.”; first response was “CAUSE=virtual disk is empty”.
- Change only the faulty EFI entry: input was “The Linux root UUID and Windows Boot Manager entry both match the manifest; only ubuntu loader path differs.”; first response was “PATCH=rebuild every boot entry”.
- Define repeatable boot acceptance: input was “Acceptance is five Linux boots, two Windows boots, recovery-menu access, and zero changes outside the EFI entry.”; first response was “ACCEPT=Linux boots once”.
Do not add a task, fixture, optimization goal, live-action claim, or second correction round.06 · Corrected output
Corrected final result
VIRTUAL BOOT REPAIR DECISION LOG RVB-3466 — AFTER ONE FAILURE-ONLY CORRECTION
Task: repair a broken boot configuration. Evaluation focus: Boot Recovery. This is a fictional, text-only artifact; it does not report a live action.
RVB-3466-R1 :: RESULT=CAUSE=ubuntu entry targets missing.efi; valid target is shimx64.efi
RVB-3466-R1-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
RVB-3466-R2 :: RESULT=SNAPSHOT=freeze SNAP-BEFORE; UUID 7f2a; hash 8c2e11a0
RVB-3466-R2-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
RVB-3466-R3 :: RESULT=PATCH=point ubuntu to shimx64.efi; retain root UUID
RVB-3466-R3-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
RVB-3466-R4 :: RESULT=SECURE_BOOT=keep enabled; use signed shimx64.efi; reject grub-test.efi
RVB-3466-R4-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
RVB-3466-R5 :: RESULT=ACCEPT=Linux 5/5; Windows 2/2; recovery menu opens
RVB-3466-R5-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
Artifact boundary: exactly five scored rows were frozen for RVB-3466; any failed row remains visible because only one correction pass is allowed.Final score: 6/10
07 · Five checks, two points each
Five-check record
The first and final statuses are textual as well as color coded. Each final pass is worth two points; the displayed verdict is tied to the final total.
| Check | First | Final | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identify the seeded boot entry fault | Fail | Pass | Public fixture: VM VBOOT-04 has EFI entry ubuntu pointing to \EFI\ubuntu\missing.efi; signed loader exists at \EFI\ubuntu\shimx64.efi. Semantic rule: The broken path and the existing signed loader establish the bounded configuration fault. FIRST returned “CAUSE=virtual disk is empty”; the private static semantic key accepts “CAUSE=ubuntu entry targets missing.efi; valid target is shimx64.efi”, so it fails. FINAL returned “CAUSE=ubuntu entry targets missing.efi; valid target is shimx64.efi”, so it passes. No live result was counted. |
| Preserve the VM snapshot | Pass | Pass | Public fixture: Snapshot SNAP-BEFORE has disk UUID 7f2a and SHA-256 8c2e11a0; no repair may precede it. Semantic rule: A reversible boot repair requires the exact pre-change snapshot and identity. FIRST returned “SNAPSHOT=freeze SNAP-BEFORE; UUID 7f2a; hash 8c2e11a0”; the private static semantic key accepts “SNAPSHOT=freeze SNAP-BEFORE; UUID 7f2a; hash 8c2e11a0”, so it passes. FINAL returned “SNAPSHOT=freeze SNAP-BEFORE; UUID 7f2a; hash 8c2e11a0”, so it passes. No live result was counted. |
| Change only the faulty EFI entry | Fail | Fail | Public fixture: The Linux root UUID and Windows Boot Manager entry both match the manifest; only ubuntu loader path differs. Semantic rule: The diff must be limited to the one path proven wrong by the fixture. FIRST returned “PATCH=rebuild every boot entry”; the private static semantic key accepts “PATCH=point ubuntu to shimx64.efi; retain root UUID; retain Windows Boot Manager”, so it fails. FINAL returned “PATCH=point ubuntu to shimx64.efi; retain root UUID”, so it fails. No live result was counted. |
| Retain Secure Boot | Pass | Pass | Public fixture: Secure Boot is enabled and shimx64.efi signature status is valid; unsigned grub-test.efi is present only as a trap. Semantic rule: A repair cannot weaken the stated trust boundary when a valid signed loader exists. FIRST returned “SECURE_BOOT=keep enabled; use signed shimx64.efi; reject grub-test.efi”; the private static semantic key accepts “SECURE_BOOT=keep enabled; use signed shimx64.efi; reject grub-test.efi”, so it passes. FINAL returned “SECURE_BOOT=keep enabled; use signed shimx64.efi; reject grub-test.efi”, so it passes. No live result was counted. |
| Define repeatable boot acceptance | Fail | Fail | Public fixture: Acceptance is five Linux boots, two Windows boots, recovery-menu access, and zero changes outside the EFI entry. Semantic rule: The boot matrix and bounded configuration diff must all pass. FIRST returned “ACCEPT=Linux boots once”; the private static semantic key accepts “ACCEPT=Linux 5/5; Windows 2/2; recovery menu opens; EFI-only diff”, so it fails. FINAL returned “ACCEPT=Linux 5/5; Windows 2/2; recovery menu opens”, so it fails. No live result was counted. |
Initial4/10
Final6/10
Verdictmixed
RecommendedNo
08 · No cleanup by omission
What worked—and what failed
What worked
- RVB-3466 preserved the exact public prompt, first artifact, failure-only correction, final artifact, and independently derived semantic check results.
- Identify the seeded boot entry fault passed because the parsed final answer matched the private fixture rule rather than merely repeating an input identifier.
- Preserve the VM snapshot also passed its task-specific rule with the final answer left visible.
What failed or remained weak
- Change only the faulty EFI entry still failed after the only permitted correction; its final value and expected semantic rule remain quoted in the evidence.
- Define repeatable boot acceptance still failed after the only permitted correction; its final value and expected semantic rule remain quoted in the evidence.
09 · Inspectable record
Evidence notes
Boot logs, configuration comparison, and repeated restarts will verify whether the repair addresses only the seeded fault.
- RVB-3466 stores the public five-input fixture separately from the private semantic answer strings quoted only after evaluation.
- RVB-3466's first and final scores were recomputed from parsed RESULT rows: 2 and 3 passes multiplied by two.
- RVB-3466 preserves every unresolved final mismatch; the source evidence plan remains unexecuted because this is a static synthetic benchmark: Boot logs, configuration comparison, and repeated restarts will verify whether the repair addresses only the seeded fault.
10 · Boundary of the claim
Limitations
- RVB-3466 is a static synthetic response benchmark, not evidence that the task succeeded with a real person, organization, device, account, service, or environment.
- RVB-3466 uses one Codex multi-agent transcript and a private deterministic fixture key; another prompt, model, evaluator, or real-world input could produce a different result.