Completed field testSynthetic benchmark
Computers · Evidence record
Why Does This Certificate Chain Break on One Client: All Five Semantic Checks Passed
This completed synthetic TLS Diagnosis field test asked the session to debug a certificate-chain failure that affects one client, preserved an actual five-row tls chain diagnostic record, and derived 2/10 then 10/10 from task-specific semantic checks after one failure-only correction.
- Exact prompts and outputs
- One correction only
- Synthetic inputs disclosed
01 · The assignment
The task
debug a certificate-chain failure that affects one client
02 · Scope before score
Test disclosures
Input disclosure
All inputs in DCC-5329 are fictional and appear verbatim in the exact prompt. Hidden scoring answers were not shown to the response generator. No personal, production, customer, learner, or device data was used. Per-case elapsed time was not instrumented, so durationMinutes is recorded as 0 rather than an estimate.
Run disclosure
A Codex multi-agent session generated one text-only first artifact for “debug a certificate-chain failure that affects one client”. We froze it, evaluated its five parsed result rows against private task-specific rules, returned only the failed check names once, and parsed the revision against the same rules. This synthetic corpus intentionally contains varied response quality and is not a claim about a live tool run. No command was executed, no external or live system was accessed or changed, and nothing was sent, published, deployed, uploaded, submitted, purchased, booked, contacted, called, emailed, or messaged. No external, live, or production action occurred. Per-case elapsed time was not instrumented during the batch session.
- Evidence mode
- Synthetic benchmark
- Run environment
- Codex multi-agent session
- Model disclosure
- Exact underlying model identifier not disclosed by the Codex session
03 · Verbatim input
Exact first prompt
The recorded session received the following prompt without silent additions.
Complete a bounded synthetic field test for: debug a certificate-chain failure that affects one client. Focus: TLS Diagnosis.
Source scenario: The experiment will provide sanitized certificates, client trust stores, handshake logs, and a known intermediate-chain defect.
Use only these five public fictional inputs; the scoring answers are intentionally withheld:
DCC-5329-I1: Server sends leaf L1 and root R1 but omits intermediate I1; Client A caches I1 and Client B does not.
DCC-5329-I2: L1 issuer is I1, I1 issuer is R1, and R1 is trusted on both clients; all three signatures validate.
DCC-5329-I3: Leaf SAN contains api.lab.example and not www.lab.example; failing request uses api.lab.example.
DCC-5329-I4: Static evaluation time is 2026-08-10; L1 is valid 2026-07-01 through 2026-10-01; I1 through 2028-01-01.
DCC-5329-I5: Approved fix is to serve L1+I1, never R1; acceptance is clean validation on A and B with hostname api.lab.example.
Return a concrete tls chain diagnostic record with exactly five result rows, assumptions visible, and no claim that a command, message, booking, transaction, teaching session, or live-system change occurred. Evidence target: Independent chain verification on two clean clients will check the diagnosed cause, trust path, hostname, dates, and proposed repair.04 · Baseline preserved
First result
The first response is retained before scoring or correction.
TLS CHAIN DIAGNOSTIC RECORD DCC-5329 — FIRST FROZEN ARTIFACT
Task: debug a certificate-chain failure that affects one client. Evaluation focus: TLS Diagnosis. This is a fictional, text-only artifact; it does not report a live action.
DCC-5329-R1 :: RESULT=CAUSE=Client B has no network connection
DCC-5329-R1-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
DCC-5329-R2 :: RESULT=CHAIN=L1>R1 and ignore I1
DCC-5329-R2-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
DCC-5329-R3 :: RESULT=HOSTNAME=any name is valid because the root is trusted
DCC-5329-R3-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
DCC-5329-R4 :: RESULT=DATES=L1 valid on 2026-08-10; I1 valid; expiry not causal
DCC-5329-R4-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
DCC-5329-R5 :: RESULT=FIX=install I1 manually on Client B only
DCC-5329-R5-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
Artifact boundary: exactly five scored rows were frozen for DCC-5329; any failed row remains visible because only one correction pass is allowed.Initial score: 2/10
05 · One pass only
Exact correction prompt
Only this single correction was allowed; there was no second repair pass.
Revise DCC-5329 once. Preserve every row that passed. Reconsider only the failed semantic checks below using the original fictional inputs; the private expected answer is not supplied:
- Identify the missing intermediate: input was “Server sends leaf L1 and root R1 but omits intermediate I1; Client A caches I1 and Client B does not.”; first response was “CAUSE=Client B has no network connection”.
- Verify the ordered trust path: input was “L1 issuer is I1, I1 issuer is R1, and R1 is trusted on both clients; all three signatures validate.”; first response was “CHAIN=L1>R1 and ignore I1”.
- Preserve hostname validation: input was “Leaf SAN contains api.lab.example and not www.lab.example; failing request uses api.lab.example.”; first response was “HOSTNAME=any name is valid because the root is trusted”.
- Choose the server-side repair and retest: input was “Approved fix is to serve L1+I1, never R1; acceptance is clean validation on A and B with hostname api.lab.example.”; first response was “FIX=install I1 manually on Client B only”.
Do not add a task, fixture, optimization goal, live-action claim, or second correction round.06 · Corrected output
Corrected final result
TLS CHAIN DIAGNOSTIC RECORD DCC-5329 — AFTER ONE FAILURE-ONLY CORRECTION
Task: debug a certificate-chain failure that affects one client. Evaluation focus: TLS Diagnosis. This is a fictional, text-only artifact; it does not report a live action.
DCC-5329-R1 :: RESULT=CAUSE=server omits I1; ClientA succeeds from cache; ClientB fails
DCC-5329-R1-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
DCC-5329-R2 :: RESULT=CHAIN=L1>I1>R1; 3 signatures valid; R1 trusted on A and B
DCC-5329-R2-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
DCC-5329-R3 :: RESULT=HOSTNAME=api.lab.example matches SAN
DCC-5329-R3-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
DCC-5329-R4 :: RESULT=DATES=L1 valid on 2026-08-10; I1 valid; expiry not causal
DCC-5329-R4-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
DCC-5329-R5 :: RESULT=FIX=serve L1+I1; omit R1; ClientA pass; ClientB pass
DCC-5329-R5-NOTE :: The proposed technical step is static and bounded; no command output or successful device change is invented.
Artifact boundary: exactly five scored rows were frozen for DCC-5329; any failed row remains visible because only one correction pass is allowed.Final score: 10/10
07 · Five checks, two points each
Five-check record
The first and final statuses are textual as well as color coded. Each final pass is worth two points; the displayed verdict is tied to the final total.
| Check | First | Final | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identify the missing intermediate | Fail | Pass | Public fixture: Server sends leaf L1 and root R1 but omits intermediate I1; Client A caches I1 and Client B does not. Semantic rule: The contrasting client caches and sent-chain inventory isolate the missing intermediate. FIRST returned “CAUSE=Client B has no network connection”; the private static semantic key accepts “CAUSE=server omits I1; ClientA succeeds from cache; ClientB fails”, so it fails. FINAL returned “CAUSE=server omits I1; ClientA succeeds from cache; ClientB fails”, so it passes. No live result was counted. |
| Verify the ordered trust path | Fail | Pass | Public fixture: L1 issuer is I1, I1 issuer is R1, and R1 is trusted on both clients; all three signatures validate. Semantic rule: Issuer relationships require the intermediate in the verified order. FIRST returned “CHAIN=L1>R1 and ignore I1”; the private static semantic key accepts “CHAIN=L1>I1>R1; 3 signatures valid; R1 trusted on A and B”, so it fails. FINAL returned “CHAIN=L1>I1>R1; 3 signatures valid; R1 trusted on A and B”, so it passes. No live result was counted. |
| Preserve hostname validation | Fail | Pass | Public fixture: Leaf SAN contains api.lab.example and not www.lab.example; failing request uses api.lab.example. Semantic rule: Chain repair cannot bypass the independent SAN hostname rule. FIRST returned “HOSTNAME=any name is valid because the root is trusted”; the private static semantic key accepts “HOSTNAME=api.lab.example matches SAN; www.lab.example does not” or “HOSTNAME=api.lab.example matches SAN”, so it fails. FINAL returned “HOSTNAME=api.lab.example matches SAN”, so it passes. No live result was counted. |
| Check the validity window | Pass | Pass | Public fixture: Static evaluation time is 2026-08-10; L1 is valid 2026-07-01 through 2026-10-01; I1 through 2028-01-01. Semantic rule: The supplied evaluation date falls inside both certificate windows. FIRST returned “DATES=L1 valid on 2026-08-10; I1 valid; expiry not causal”; the private static semantic key accepts “DATES=L1 valid on 2026-08-10; I1 valid; expiry not causal”, so it passes. FINAL returned “DATES=L1 valid on 2026-08-10; I1 valid; expiry not causal”, so it passes. No live result was counted. |
| Choose the server-side repair and retest | Fail | Pass | Public fixture: Approved fix is to serve L1+I1, never R1; acceptance is clean validation on A and B with hostname api.lab.example. Semantic rule: A complete server chain must work on both clean clients without client-specific trust edits. FIRST returned “FIX=install I1 manually on Client B only”; the private static semantic key accepts “FIX=serve L1+I1; omit R1; ClientA pass; ClientB pass; api.lab.example match” or “FIX=serve L1+I1; omit R1; ClientA pass; ClientB pass”, so it fails. FINAL returned “FIX=serve L1+I1; omit R1; ClientA pass; ClientB pass”, so it passes. No live result was counted. |
Initial2/10
Final10/10
Verdictworked
RecommendedYes, for this scope
08 · No cleanup by omission
What worked—and what failed
What worked
- DCC-5329 preserved the exact public prompt, first artifact, failure-only correction, final artifact, and independently derived semantic check results.
- Identify the missing intermediate passed because the parsed final answer matched the private fixture rule rather than merely repeating an input identifier.
- Verify the ordered trust path also passed its task-specific rule with the final answer left visible.
What failed or remained weak
- The first artifact failed Identify the missing intermediate; the one permitted correction resolved it, but the initial defect remains published.
09 · Inspectable record
Evidence notes
Independent chain verification on two clean clients will check the diagnosed cause, trust path, hostname, dates, and proposed repair.
- DCC-5329 stores the public five-input fixture separately from the private semantic answer strings quoted only after evaluation.
- DCC-5329's first and final scores were recomputed from parsed RESULT rows: 1 and 5 passes multiplied by two.
- DCC-5329 preserves every unresolved final mismatch; the source evidence plan remains unexecuted because this is a static synthetic benchmark: Independent chain verification on two clean clients will check the diagnosed cause, trust path, hostname, dates, and proposed repair.
10 · Boundary of the claim
Limitations
- DCC-5329 is a static synthetic response benchmark, not evidence that the task succeeded with a real person, organization, device, account, service, or environment.
- DCC-5329 uses one Codex multi-agent transcript and a private deterministic fixture key; another prompt, model, evaluator, or real-world input could produce a different result.